How objects are represented and processed in the brain remains a key issue in cognitive neuroscience. We have developed a conceptual structure account in which category-specific semantic deficits emerge due to differences in the structure and content of concepts rather than from explicit divisions of conceptual knowledge in separate stores. The primary claim is that concepts associated with particular categories (e.g., animals, tools) differ in the number and type of properties and the extent to which these properties are correlated with each other. In this review, we describe recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies in which we have extended our theoretical account by incorporating recent claims about the neuroanatomical basis of feature integration and differentiation that arise from research into hierarchical object processing streams in nonhuman primates and humans. A clear picture has emerged in which the human perirhinal cortex and neighbouring anteromedial temporal structures appear to provide the neural infrastructure for making fine-grained discriminations among objects, suggesting that damage within the perirhinal cortex may underlie the emergence of category-specific semantic deficits in brain-damaged patients.
particular category of living things, such as animals or fruit (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Moss, Tyler, & Jennings, 1997; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) , although the opposite pattern has occasionally been described (Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992) . In this review we describe a series of investigations in which we have tested key predictions of the CSA with respect to recent claims about the role of the perirhinal cortex in object processing. With this approach we have built on our earlier research by incorporating neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence concerning the neural correlates of object processing at different levels of specificity.
The primary claim of the CSA is that concepts associated with particular categories (e.g., animals, tools) differ in the number and type of properties and the extent to which these properties are correlated with each other. Within this framework we explain the emergence of selective semantic deficits in terms of differences in the internal structure of concepts in different domains of knowledge. Concepts within living-things categories, such as animals and fruits, tend to be similar in their internal structure. They are characterized by many overlapping and intercorrelated shared features (e.g., animals tend to have legs, eyes, teeth), but relatively few distinctive, distinguishing features (e.g., mane, hump, pouch; DurrantPeatfield, Tyler, Moss, & Levy, 1997; Gaffan & Heywood, 1993; Greer et al., 2001; Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Randall, Moss, Rodd, Greer, & Tyler, 2004; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Tyler et al., 2000) . Moreover, the distinctive features of living things tend to be only weakly correlated with one another (for example, there is little correlation between having a mane, being fierce, having a pouch, and so on). In contrast, nonliving concepts (such as tools and vehicles) tend to be less visually similar, with a relatively greater proportion of distinctive to shared properties, and with a greater degree of correlation among distinctive features (e.g., the specific form and function of an artifact are often strongly correlated; Greer et al., 2001; Moss, Tyler, & Devlin, 2002; Tyler et al., 2000) . In other words, nonliving concepts are less confusable. Such differences among conceptual domains are supported by an analysis of our property norms (Tyler et al., 2000) . We have suggested that it is these differences in the internal structure of concepts within different categories that underpin the emergence of category-specific semantic deficits (Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Tyler et al., 2000) . As weakly correlated, distinctive properties are more susceptible to damage than are intercorrelated, shared properties (which are mutually reinforcing by their coactivation), this will result in a disproportionate deficit for living things (Tyler et al., 2000) , although this may critically depend upon the task. For example, if the task requires knowledge of properties of concepts shared with other category members (rather than their distinctive properties), we would predict similar performance for living and nonliving things-a pattern that we have reported for several patients with category-specific impairments for living things (Moss et al., 1998; Moss et al., 2002; Tyler & Moss, 2001) . It is only when the task requires access to the distinctive, distinguishing properties of objects that a living-things deficit will emerge, due to a greater degree of similarity and the weak correlations among distinctive features within living-things categories. Thus, in contrast to theories that explain category-specific deficits in terms of damage to anatomically distinct, content-specific stores (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Shelton & Caramazza, 1999) , the CSA provides a framework in which deficits may occur due to damage to a unitary, distributed semantic system.
In this review we present findings from a series of studies integrating the central claims of the CSA with recent theoretical accounts concerning the neural substrates of object processing in the brain.
Although hierarchical organization within the visual system has been a fundamental theme in the study of primate visual cortex, evidence has only recently been brought to bear on whether such a hierarchy of object-processing stages extends throughout the ventral occipital and temporal cortex. For example, recent studies in nonhuman primates have suggested that different stages along the anterior-posterior axis of the ventral processing stream code different types of visual feature, leading from simple combinations of features in posterior regions to complex feature configurations in more anterior and medial temporal cortices (e.g., Buckley, this issue; Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, this issue; Hampton, this issue; Lerner, Hendler, Ben-Bashat, Harel, & Malach, 2001; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Murray & Richmond, 2001) .
A hierarchical theory of object processing in humans has also been proposed by Damasio (1989) and later developed by Simmons and Barsalou (2003) . The claim is that, when processing an object, the visual features associated with it (colour, shape, etc.) are bound together in convergence zones (CZs). In the latter model CZs are arranged hierarchically, such that those in posterior regions code simple combinations of features, and those in more anterior regions bind features into increasingly complex conjunctions of features. Such a structure provides a basis for processing objects at different levels of specificity, with posterior CZs representing more coarse-grained configurations of features (e.g., colour or shape or motion), converging on anteromedial CZs, which enable the coding of more complex feature conjunctions underlying object identification (e.g., colour and shape and motion). These CZs, rather than storing conjunctions of features, function by pointing back or indexing those sensorimotor areas where the features are stored. In this way the CZs represent the co-occurrence of features necessary for the retrieval of a holistic representation.
Evidence that the perirhinal cortex may function as the endpoint of a hierarchically organized object-processing network providing the basis for fine-grained discrimination among objects is supported by a number of lesion studies in monkeys and other nonhuman species (e.g., Buckley, this issue; Buckley, Booth, Rolls, & Gaffan, 2001; Buckley & Gaffan, 1998; Bussey, Muir, & Aggleton, 1999; Eacott, Gaffan, & Murray, 1994; Gilbert & Kesner, 2003; Sato & Nakamura, 2003; Zola-Morgan, Squire, Amaral, & Suzuki, 1989) . Although the evidence in humans is more controversial (e.g., Aggleton & Shaw, 1996; Reed & Squire, 1997) , it strongly supports the premise that perirhinal cortex damage, on its own or in combination with other medial temporal lobe structures, will produce a severe object-recognition impairment (Holdstock, this issue) . However, the nature of this object-processing deficit is unclear with respect to what aspect of object processing is compromised by anteromedial temporal damage. Studies in lesioned animals have suggested that anteromedial temporal cortices (and the perirhinal cortex in particular) may function to enable the identification of a particular configuration of features specific to an object to facilitate object identification and discrimination. For example, Bussey, Saksida, and Murray (2002, this issue) , demonstrated that monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions showed unimpaired visual discrimination among complex object pairs in conditions where there were no ambiguous features, moderately impaired where 50% of features were explicitly ambiguous, and severely impaired where all features were ambiguous. Complementary evidence has also been reported by Buckley and colleagues in which macaques with perirhinal ablation were severely impaired on perceptual tasks requiring discrimination among complex combinations of object features, but not on tasks requiring discrimination of single or less complex features (Buckley, this issue; Buckley et al., 2001; Buckley & Gaffan, 1998) . However, human studies have produced inconsistent results, with Barense et al. (Barense, 2005; Lee, Barense, & Graham, this issue) providing evidence that novel object discriminations are influenced by feature ambiguity in amnesic patients with perirhinal damage, but Holdstock, Gutnikov, Gaffan, and Mayes (2000; Holdstock, this issue) suggesting that the perirhinal cortex does not have a specific role in the representation of complex visual stimuli (although their data are based on patients with residual preservation of this area).
Given its reciprocal connections with different sensory cortical areas, it has been claimed that, in monkeys, the perirhinal cortex involvement in object processing is not restricted to visual analysis, but is also critically involved in linking diverse aspects of information about objects across modalities (Murray & Richmond, 2001) . A similar role for the perirhinal cortex in the human object-processing system has recently been proposed by Simmons and Barsalou (2003) , in which, by nature of its reciprocal connections with inferior temporal cortex and other polymodal brain areas, it is able to integrate information about an object across modalities.
We have argued that one implication of a hierarchically organized object-processing system is that the nature of cortical involvement may not be an invariant process, but is determined, at least in part, by the level or type of processing demands required rather than being driven purely by the visual stimulus itself (Moss, Rodd, Stamatakis, Bright, & Tyler, 2005; Tyler et al., 2004) . Evidence consistent with process-driven object processing in anterior temporal cortex has been provided by Grabowski et al. (2001) , in which retrieval of proper names of very different complex visual stimuli (persons and landmarks) engaged the same region of the left temporal pole to a similar degree, which these authors suggested was consistent with this area reflecting the level of specificity of retrieval rather than the specific properties of the stimuli. A process-driven view of anteromedial temporal cortex is also consistent with evidence from the memory literature that these regions are involved either in the time-limited consolidation of newly acquired memory representations prior to their storage elsewhere (e.g., Alvarez & Squire, 1994) or else act as indexers or pointers to information held in other regions of the brain (e.g., Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997) . Recent evidence has emerged that other regions of the inferior temporal cortex may reflect the nature of visual object-processing demands rather than specific stimulus attributes. Gauthier and colleagues, for example, describe a number of studies suggesting that the "fusiform face area", rather than being a face-specific processing area (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris, 1999) , may be associated with a large variety of objects, but will be more active under conditions requiring classification at a subordinate level rather than at a more general, categorical level (Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000) . Together, these findings are most consistent with a nonmodular object-processing system in which neuroanatomical differentiation associated with the processing of different types of object reflects the level of processing demands necessary to identify or discriminate among objects rather than signalling stimulus or domain-specific recruitment.
The hierarchical object-processing model, in combination with the CSA, provides a framework for explaining the frequent association of category-specific deficits for living things and damage to anterior ventromedial temporal cortex (including perirhinal and entorhinal cortices, parahippocampal gyrus, and hippocampus), usually as a consequence of herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE). Within the CSA framework we have argued that, as living things are more similar (i.e., they have more shared features-they have legs, eyes, etc.) than artefacts, they are therefore more difficult to differentiate. This places greater demands on those processes that are involved in the integration of complex conjunctions of features and fine-grained discrimination. On the assumption that anteromedial temporal cortex is the most plausible candidate region for integration and differentiation, we predicted that fine-grained discrimination among living things, relative to nonliving things, will place greater demands on anterior temporal cortical areas (Moss et al., 2005) .
We have tested these claims in a series of fMRI studies with healthy participants and behavioural studies with patients, arguing that, if the same kind of hierarchical objectprocessing system suggested by primate studies also operates in humans, we would expect differential activation of ventral temporal cortex as a function of the level or type of object processing required. Specifically, to the extent that fine-grained discrimination among similar objects is required, we would predict anteromedial temporal cortex involvement. However, where the task does not require the extraction of such detailed information about an object, involvement would be primarily restricted to more posterior object-processing areas of the temporal cortex. Moreover, these differential patterns will be modulated by the internal properties of concepts, with living-things concepts generating a relatively greater involvement of anteromedial temporal cortex than that for nonliving things, but only when fine-grained discrimination among objects is required (Moss et al., 2005; Tyler et al., 2004) .
In a first study, we employed fMRI to explore the neural correlates of object processing, by presenting healthy participants with pictures of common objects and asking them to name the objects either at the domain level (i.e., whether the object was living or man-made) or at a basic level (to name the object itself, for example, "dog", "lion", "table"). We argued that naming at a basic level requires fine-grained differentiation among objects in order that, for example, a picture can be differentiated from similar objects-thus, a lion can be differentiated from a tiger or a leopard . On the assumption that anteromedial temporal cortex is critically involved in processes of fine-grained discrimination, we predicted greater anteromedial temporal cortex involvement when participants named the picture at a basic level than when they named it at a domain level. The activation of complex conjunctions of features is not necessary for domain-level naming, which can be achieved on the basis of relatively coarse-grained information (there is no requirement for discriminating among objects within a category); thus we predicted that this condition would only activate intermediate object-processing areas and not anteromedial temporal cortex.
In the study, participants silently named the same set of coloured photos of common objects at the basic and domain level (in two separate sessions). We included baseline events (a fixation cross) in each session. The results were unambiguous (see Figure 1, panel A) . At the conventional fMRI statistical threshold of .001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons), basic-level naming produced predominantly left-sided temporal activation, which included the entire extent of the fusiform gyrus (BA 19/37/36), extending into anteromedial temporal cortex (including entorhinal cortex, BA 28). We also investigated the pattern of activation at a more liberal threshold (.01), which, although increasing the likelihood of false positives, provides information regarding the spatial profile of activation below the standard statistical cut-off. At this threshold, activation extended medially to involve perirhinal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus. Domain-level naming produced activations restricted to the same posterior temporal regions (BA 19, 37), but there was no activation of anterior temporal cortex even when the lower statistical threshold was applied. A direct comparison of basic-against domain-level naming produced significantly more activation in entorhinal and perirhinal cortices .
These results show that anteromedial temporal cortex was significantly involved in object processing only when the information-processing demands required relatively fine-grained discriminations among objects. Thus, although participants saw exactly the same stimuli in domain-and basic-level naming conditions, anteromedial involvement appeared to be driven by the processing demands of the task, rather than by the stimulus itself (Figure 1, panel B) . We argued on the basis of these data that the specific processes associated with this aspect of object processing relate to the activation of complex configurations of features of the stimulus necessary for basic-level naming. As domain-level naming does not require processing at this level of specificity, activation was restricted to more posterior regions of the inferior temporal cortex .
This account also helps to explain the nature of some of the cognitive impairments observed in patients with HSE and semantic dementia (SD). Typically, these patients are unable to consistently name objects at a basic level (e.g., to name a picture of a cat as a cat), but can identify the category to which the object belongs (e.g., "animal"). A hierarchical processing model combined with the CSA suggests that damage at different points along the object-processing pathway should affect a patient's ability to process an object at particular levels of conceptual specificity. Where a patient's damage predominantly involves anteromedial temporal cortex, we predicted a deficit in fine-grained discrimination among objects (involved in basic-level naming), but preserved coarse-grained discriminations (involved in category or domain-level naming). The extent to which lower level discriminations are affected would relate to the extent to which the lesion extends into more posterior areas.
To test this hypothesis, we examined picture-naming performance in four HSE patients, all of whom have extensive left hemisphere anterior temporal cortex damage, but with relatively preserved posterior left inferior temporal cortex. In other words, the same areas found to be active during domain-level naming in healthy adults were largely preserved, while those additional areas active during basic-level naming were damaged in all patients . In all four cases, when asked to identify the pictures, a large proportion of responses were either category coordinate errors (e.g., to name a picture of a cat as a dog), or superordinate errors (e.g., to name a cat as an animal), consistent with a particular difficulty in making relatively fine-grained discriminations among objects. On another picturenaming task, directly comparable with that used in the fMRI study, patients were severely impaired on basic-level naming (with a similar profile of error types as found in the first naming study), but unimpaired on domain-level naming (requiring a living thing or manmade response). The results of the fMRI and neuropsychological data together suggest that it may be the left anteromedial regions (including perirhinal and entorhinal cortices), routinely damaged in HSE, that underlie these patients failure to correctly identify objects, and that preservation of more coarse-grained, domain-level naming may be attributed to the relatively unaffected posterior areas of the inferior temporal cortices.
The CSA framework with its claims about variation in the internal structure of concepts enables us to make the further claim for differentiation of activation within anteromedial temporal cortex as a function of the structure of concepts. Living things, with their high degree of within-category similarity, should place relatively greater demands on those object-processing regions-anteromedial temporal cortex-associated with fine-grained discrimination. Thus, basic-level naming for living things should place greater demands on anteromedial cortex (including entorhinal and perirhinal cortices) than should artefacts since they are less confusable. In contrast, domain-level naming, which does not require access to fine-grained detail but relies on shared information, should not produce differential activation for concepts within different categories of knowledge, and activation for both should be confined to more posterior temporal regions.
We tested these claims in a second fMRI event-related study in which healthy participants silently named pictures of common objects from the categories of animals, fruits and vegetables, tools, and vehicles (see Moss et al., 2005 , for further details). We also included baseline events (a fixation cross) in each session. As in our earlier study, participants named the objects at a basic level in one block and the same objects at a domain level in a second block (counterbalanced). Living and nonliving trials were randomly presented. The results are shown in Figure 2 (panel A).
The key results are the comparisons of the two visually complex categories (animals and vehicles) and the two visually simple categories (fruit/vegetables and tools). These pairs of categories were also matched on concept agreement, exemplarity, familiarity, and age of acquisition of the basic-level name. The analysis focused on the anteromedial temporal cortex region, which was activated in our earlier study and which included the left perirhinal and entorhinal cortices. As predicted, there was significantly more activation during the basic-level naming of animals relative to vehicles and for fruits and vegetables relative to tools. In both cases the peak was found in the region of the entorhinal cortex (BA 28/34). For completeness, we also compared the nonmatched living and nonliving categories (animals vs. tools, and fruits and vegetables vs. vehicles). Once again, and in both cases, we found significant living over nonliving activations in the entorhinal/dorsal entorhinal cortex (BA 28/34) during basic-level naming. Importantly, there were no differences in any of the comparisons for domain-level naming. Thus, only during basic-level naming was activation in anteromedial temporal cortex modulated as a function of the category from which the objects were drawn (Moss et al., 2005) .
These findings clearly suggest an important role for anteromedial temporal cortex in visual object processing at high levels of conceptual specificity. Consistent with the CSA, different objects appear to place greater or lesser demands on these processes according to variations in their internal structure. The greater similarity of objects within living-things categories renders them less distinguishable from each other, and therefore they require the involvement of anteromedial temporal cortex in addition to more posterior regions, which are associated with the processing of objects from both living and nonliving categories.
These results also provide a framework within which to account for patterns of semantic deficits seen in various types of brain-damaged patients. Patients with HSE, associated primarily with ventromedial temporal cortical damage, typically show disproportionate deficits for living things over artefacts. In contrast, semantic dementia patients commonly have anterolateral temporal cortical damage, but not usually the extensive anteromedial temporal lesions associated with HSE, although the typical lateral-medial spread of disease remains unclear ( Talairach and Tournoux (1988) . Animals versus vehicles resulted in a cluster in the parahippocampal area BA 28, also extending anteriorly to BA 34. Animals versus tools produced a cluster in BA 28. Fruit and vegetables versus vehicles resulted in a cluster in BA 34, and finally fruit and vegetables versus tools resulted in a cluster in BA 28. Talairach y coordinates are shown underneath each anatomical slice where left ϭ left. Slices were selected on the basis of maximum cluster extent in this plane. Plots of signal change (with standard error bars) for the relevant contrasts are shown next to each slice (living things categories in blue; artefact categories in red). (B) Common lesions for the HSE and semantic dementia groups plus overlap of the basic-level naming activations for the living minus nonliving categories (shown in solid green) superimposed on the mean patient T1 scan. The lesions were detected by comparing each patient to a control group and conducting conjunction analyses in the two groups (conjunction T scores are shown in the colour bars). The activations overlap shows those areas where two or more of the four comparisons shows an overlap (animals vs. vehicles, animals vs. tools, fruit and vegetables vs. vehicles, and fruit and vegetables vs. tools) in the basic-level naming task, superimposed on the mean patient brain.
2004; Mummery et al., 2000; Simons, Graham, & Hodges, 1999) and needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Different profiles of damage across these two semantically impaired groups of patients can provide a means of testing the prediction that the emergence of category-specific deficits is dependent upon the extent of damage in anteromedial temporal cortex. More specifically, in the context of the CSA framework, if the perirhinal cortex provides the neural basis for integration of features and differentiation among objects, a category-specific semantic deficit for living things should only be observed to the extent that damage encroached into these areas (Moss et al., 2005) .
We compared the performance of three HSE patients and three SD patients, all of whom had severe object-naming deficits (Moss et al., 2005) . A lesion analysis confirmed that the common lesion in the HSE group involved a large area of the left temporal cortex (including inferior, middle, and superior temporal cortex) extending medially to encompass parahippocampal gyrus and entorhinal and perirhinal cortices. The lesion common to the SD patients was smaller and was centred on the left temporal pole (also including middle temporal gyrus and anterior fusiform gyrus). Critically, unlike the HSE patients, the SD patients at the time that the MRI and behavioural data were acquired did not have damage within the perirhinal cortex or other anteromedial temporal regions identified in the fMRI studies as involved in fine-grained differentiation among objects (Figure 2, panel B) . This finding contrasts with a recent volumetric group study of medial temporal lobe volumes in SD and Alzheimer patients by Davies, Graham, Xuereb, Williams, and Hodges (2004) , in which the perirhinal (and entorhinal) cortex in their SD patients was found to be severely damaged relative to other medial temporal structures and with volumes significantly smaller than those found in healthy controls. However, in two of our SD patients for which we were able to acquire annual scans, we observed a clear progression of atrophy both posteriorally and medially, which extended over time to involve further medial temporal lobe regions, including perirhinal and entorhinal cortex as well as middle temporal gyrus (Bright, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2005) . There is considerable heterogeneity in the pattern and progress of disease progression in SD, and it is likely that the difference between our study and that of Davies et al. may relate in part to the point in progression of the disorder. Figure 3 shows performance on three semantic tasks, all of which employed the same four categories as those used in the fMRI study (animals, fruits and vegetables, tools, vehicles). The tasks included basic-level picture naming (72 items), property verification from verbal input (80 items), and category fluency. There is a clear difference in the pattern of responses made by the HSE and SD patients. On naming and property verification all HSE patients performed significantly worse (p Ͻ .01) on living things than on nonliving things. In contrast, SD patients did not show this pattern; they were equally poor on living and nonliving things. On category fluency, the HSE patients also showed a disproportionate advantage for nonliving things, generating almost twice as many exemplars than for living things. In contrast, there was no evidence for a selective deficit for living things in the SD patients, despite an equivalent overall semantic impairment in both groups (in fact, these patients showed a numerical advantage for living things). The fact that the HSE patients have a disproportionate deficit for living things in tasks requiring fine-grained differentiation and have anteromedial damage is consistent with the fMRI data showing significantly greater activation in the same region during the fine-grained discrimination of living things relative to artefacts.
We have built on these findings in a recent study in which we employ a lesion-behaviour correlational approach in order to map the sensitivity of brain tissue integrity to performance among different conditions of a semantic task. Specifically, we related lesion extent as determined by structural MRI data to variations in patients' performance. This method uses two continuous measures-signal intensity values for each voxel in the brain (a measure of tissue integrity) and continuous scores on a behavioural test, thus avoiding binarizing either the structural data as damaged or healthy, or the behavioural results as impaired or preserved (for a detailed description of the methodology, see Tyler, Marslen-Wilson, & Stamatakis, 2005 ). An advantage of this approach is that no a priori assumptions are made about either patient aetiology (e.g., HSE, stroke) or the functions of specific brain regions. In the current Figure 3 . Evidence from clinical cases. Graphs show the overall accuracy of HSE and SD patients in three semantic tasks. In the naming task, patients named pictures at a basic level (e.g., lion, hammer). Scores shown as percentage correct. The property verification task provided a measure of conceptual knowledge from verbal input (e.g., "do cats have fur?", "Do forks have prongs?"), equally divided between true and false trials. Scores shown as percentage correct. For category fluency, each patient was asked to list as many animals, fruit, tools, and vehicles as they could, with 1 minute allowed for each category (data unavailable for patient WL). Scores for category fluency are actual number of correct responses. The horizontal lines indicate the average scores for living and nonliving categories in the two groups. study, we used this method to explore the pattern of correlations between signal intensities across the brain and knowledge of the distinctive and shared features of living things and artefacts within a group of brain-damaged patients. We predicted, on the basis of the CSA, that distinctive knowledge of living things would covary most closely with signal intensity in the perirhinal cortex, if this region is critically involved in integration of features and differentiation among objects.
To assess knowledge of distinct and shared features we developed a property verification task (see Moss et al., 2002) , in which we selected properties for concepts in different semantic categories. Within each category we manipulated whether the property was distinctive (true of few concepts in the category-e.g., has a mane, has bristles) or shared (true of many or all members of the category-e.g., has eyes, has a handle). On the basis of property generation data (Moss et al., 2002) , eight properties for each concept were presented (four, shared, four distinctive, divided equally into true and false trials) for a total of 10 concepts per category. Each of the questions was read out loud to the patients (e.g., "does a cow have whiskers?"), who were required to produce a "yes" or "no" response. We applied no specific criteria in our selection of patients, but simply included all patients (N ϭ 21) for whom we had obtained a whole-brain MRI scan and who had carried out the property verification study. These included cases with varying degrees of occipital, temporal, and/or frontal lobe involvement.
In line with our claims on the role of anteromedial temporal cortex in processes of finegrained differentiation amongst objects, we predicted that property verification scores for the shared features of concepts would not be associated with these regions, because knowledge of shared properties does not require within-category fine-grained differentiation. In contrast, verification of the distinctive features of a concept requires that a concept be distinguished from other concepts within the same category. The greater conceptual specificity required for correctly verifying distinctive features is therefore more likely to be dependent on processes of fine-grained discrimination. Moreover, the greater within-category similarity (i.e., a lower proportion of distinctive to shared properties) among animals than tools is likely to render these concepts particularly susceptible to damage in anteromedial regions.
For the analysis we correlated shared and distinctive property verification scores (percentage correct) for animals and tools in each voxel across all the patient scans (with global mean signal for each scan included as a confounding covariate). The critical comparison is between the pattern of brain-behaviour correlations for the distinctive properties of animals and tools. In the context of the CSA framework, we would predict that, because animals with their high degree of within-category similarity place greater demands on processes of finegrained discrimination, property verification for their distinctive features will be particularly sensitive to the integrity of the anteromedial temporal cortex. In contrast, tools, which are less similar to each other (and therefore easier to differentiate), would be less associated with damage to anteromedial temporal regions.
The results showed that the distinctive properties of animals correlated significantly (taking an uncorrected statistic of p ϭ .001) with signal intensity across a large region of anterior temporal cortex. This extended from left anterior fusiform gyrus (BA 20) , middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), and temporal pole (BA 38), medially to include parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices (BA 36, 35) . No other significant effects were observed, either for the shared properties of animals or the distinctive/shared properties of tools. To explore the pattern of activation below this statistical cut-off, we reduced the threshold ( p ϭ .01). This produced signal-behaviour correlations for distinctive properties of animals across a larger extent of left anterior inferior temporal cortex, including more anterior temporal pole, perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36), and the hippocampus. Figure 4 (top panel) shows areas of behaviour-signal covariation in the four conditions at the lower threshold. A more extensive region of left anterior temporal cortex was significantly correlated with the performance on distinctive properties in both animals and tools, relative to shared properties. Critically, however, for tools the regions associated with knowledge of distinctive properties did not correlate with signal intensity in anteromedial temporal cortex, as predicted on the basis that these regions are engaged when more fine-grained discriminations are required. Instead, significant correlations were associated with fusiform gyrus (BA 20/37) and middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), in areas partly overlapping with those found for the verification of shared properties of animals.
In Figure 4 (bottom panel) performance on distinctive properties is shown for each patient plotted against voxel values in the perirhinal cortex (BA 35, peak signal: Ϫ20 Ϫ4 Ϫ29 in Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI] space). As can be seen, there was greater variability in signal and a strong, positive correlation with the distinctive properties of animals (higher signal intensity ϭ better performance). In contrast, there was relatively little variability in signal and no evidence for a positive correlation with the distinctive properties of tools.
These findings are consistent with the idea that the left anteromedial temporal cortex (and the perirhinal cortex in particular) provides the neural basis for the integration of complex conjunctions of features, thereby enabling fine-grained discriminations among concepts. The spatial profile of correlations in each of the conditions suggest that much of the same neural network is involved in conceptual processing irrespective of category or domain, but the extent to which additional regions are recruited depends upon the level of analysis required. There is a greater demand on processes of fine-grained discrimination for animals relative to tools, because of systematic differences in the statistical properties of the two categories. Such a position is entirely consistent with the CSA in that there is no true neural specialization for one category or domain of semantic knowledge, but that disproportionate deficits in brain-damaged patients may arise due to the nature and level of the discriminations that they need to make.
The signal-behaviour correlations also show that the role of the anteromedial temporal cortex is not limited to the visual modality. Although property verification tasks can be based on pictures, our task is purely verbal, yet the results appear consistent with the fMRI and behavioural data described above. A key claim of the hierarchical object-processing account is that polymodal neurons in perirhinal cortex integrate information across a range of sensory modalities. Thus, the anteromedial cortex may be critical to semantic processing and not just to visual object recognition, as it supports the combination of many types of feature into meaningful multimodal conceptual representations.
Summary and conclusions
The results of these studies provide important insights into the way in which information about objects may be processed within the brain. In combining theoretical cognitive accounts of the representation and processing of objects with models of the neural infrastructure that supports these processes, we have extended the CSA, incorporating differences in regional recruitment during object processing as a function of the nature of the discriminations required. We claim that a disproportionate deficit for the identification of living things over artefacts is critically related to the level of damage in anteromedial temporal cortex, but only when fine-grained representations are required. The likelihood or degree of cortical involvement in conceptual processing will be shaped by the nature of the category from which an object is drawn and the level of representation required. Consistent with a process-driven involvement of anteromedial temporal cortex in object processing, objects do not invariably recruit this region: In tasks that do not require fine-grained discrimination, there are no differences in anteromedial activation between living and nonliving things and no category-specific deficits in patients with anteromedial temporal lobe damage.
The fMRI data are consistent with a unified conceptual system, because anteromedial temporal cortex is differentially activated according to the statistical properties of a concept rather than by object category or domain per se. Thus, both living things and artefacts may be associated with anteromedial temporal cortex during basic-level naming, but the higher degree of within-category similarity for living things will place greater demands on the processes of fine-grained discrimination associated with this region.
This notion of "graded" or "disproportionate" effects also applies to the deficits observed in patients with semantic deficits: We rarely, if ever, see an all-or-nothing deficit for a specific category or domain-the pattern is one of impairment across semantic categories, with milder deficits for some categories over others. For example, in the Moss et al. (2005) study, the HSE and SD patients, on average, were able to identify fewer than half the pictures of common artefacts (see Figure 3 , left panel), even though performance in the HSE patients was disproportionately poorer for naming living things. Thus, we argue against true specificity both in terms of the category-specific deficits observed in semantically impaired patients and in terms of the neural correlates of object processing in the healthy brain. In both cases (patient performance and fMRI findings), category-specific effects arise due to the differences in content and structure of concepts in those categories.
In our view, neuroimaging studies of healthy individuals undertaken in parallel with behavioural investigations of patients with clear, anatomically defined lesions can provide a powerful basis for building upon claims made in the animal literature. This approach has enabled us to extend our cognitive theory concerning the structure of semantic memory, by incorporating evidence from hierarchical models of object processing in nonhuman primates (Bussey et al., this issue) and testing its implications for conceptual processing in the human brain.
